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Article 27

Principles for the Communications
Act of 2034: The Superstructure of

Infrastructure
Eli M. Noam*
In the past, the regulation of telecommunications had been essential,
partly to protect against the various forms of network monopoly, partly to
protect monopolists themselves. In the transition to competition, what
regulation was left was seen as temporary, as shrinking reciprocally with
the growth of competition.
But can we expect the future "network of networks" to be totally selfregulating, with no rules by government? On the one hand, the more
complex and advanced any network system becomes, the less one can guide
it centrally. On the other hand, diversity does not assure optimality when
different participants pursue different strategies and private and public
objectives diverge. Some traditional subjects of regulation, such as price
and entry controls will become unnecessary. But issues involving free flow
of information, interconnectivity, universality of service, and international
asymmetry will not vanish with competition.' Thus, rules and regulations
will change, but not disappear entirely. Liberalization does not mean
libertarianism. Therefore, what kind of rules should we expect to provide
in the emerging "network of networks" interconnecting presently widely
disparate types of communications systems?
In the world of computers, a hierarchy of control instructions
exists-assembly language, machine language, and programming languages.
When it comes to societal rules, we similarly think in terms of a hierarchy.
In telecommunications there are regulations of detail; for example, what
price can be charged for a local call after five o'clock. Then there are
* Professor of Finance and Economics and Director, Columbia Institute for TeleInformation, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 809 Uris Hall, New York,
New York 10027; telephone (212) 854-8332; facsimile (212) 932-7816; internet address
enoam@research.gsb.columbia.edu.
1. This is analyzed in Eli M. Noam, Beyond Liberalization:From the Network of
Networks to the System of Systems, 18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL'Y 286 (1994).
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fundamental societal tenets, such as freedom of speech or property rights.
In between are the intermediate rules of publicpolicy, usually codified by
statutes of varying specificity.
The United States has been fairly successful in framing regulations of
detail. Although participants in the American regulatory system tend to
castigate it, the positives need to also be acknowledged, especially in
contrast to the alternatives practiced elsewhere. Regulations in America
tend to be developed and practiced openly, with opportunity for the public
and for contending stakeholders to contribute their views and challenges.
Due process and rights of appeal exist. The independent and bipartisan
system of regulatory commissions helps to create some political insulation
and policy continuity, without a total separation from the democratic and
economic forces in society. The process is capable of adapting to changing
circumstances, as the shift in telecommunications from promonopoly to
procompetition regulation demonstrates.
The fundamental rules of governance have also been quite successfully
drafted, a legacy from brief but creative historic periods when big-picture
issues were taken seriously. But the weak link in the American hierarchy
of rules, at least for telecommunications, is the intermediate range of rules
of public policy. Here, the basic documents are the creaky 1934 Communications Act, the controversial 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts, and a motley
collection of state utility laws.
The basic 1934 Communications Act was written before TV was out
of the labs; before microwave transmission; before satellites; before microelectronics; before computers; before digital data communications; and
before transatlantic telephone cables. Some of its rules are even older than
the New Deal era enactment date suggests, going back to 1910 MannElkins Act provisions that applied to telephony principles of railroad
regulation, which in turn date back to 1887 on the federal level and even
further for some states.
Given the dynamic telecommunications environment, the 1934 Act is
at its best when its provisions are fairly general, with details provided by
the regulations of the specialized Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) that the Act created. It is least effective where it is
overly specific, almost assuring problems a few years later, since it is
usually more difficult to change a law than to modify a regulation.2

2. Thus, few of the main changes in telecommunications policy that in the aggregate
broke the monopoly system over the past two decades have originated in congressional
legislation.
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In telecommunications, Congress is at its legitimate best when it sets
national rules of public policy. It has been at its procedural worst when it
assumes the role of a quasi-regulatory agency and writes into law numerous
rules of detail. This happens when it distrusts an agency controlled by
another party, when a transitional leadership vacuum exists at an agency,
or when it is enticed to closely arbitrate nettlesome power struggles among
stakeholders.
THE NEED FOR NEW PRINCIPLES
But what should these broad principles of telecommunications be? In
the past decade, policy was correctly focused on creating competitive
openness by reducing barriers and permitting entry. But now, with the
fragmentation of the monopoly telecommunications environment proceeding
apace, the primary policy responsibility is to assure an integration that
permits the functioning of the emerging "network of networks."
On the conduit side of networks, such integration involves interconnectivity, interoperability, privacy protection, financial compensation, and
network universality. On the content side, different approaches govern the
different segments of the communications system, such as common and
private carriage. The difference in regulatory status is sustainable only as
long as the underlying transmission media are kept apart. As these grow
together and interconnect, the differing rules of content status come into
conflict.
One of the 1934 Act's major problems, from tomorrow's perspective,
is that it deals with separate transmission media differently. It is not
transmission-path neutral. This was workable in the past, but is not where
3
technology and applications are taking us.
Let us therefore think of ourselves as an electronic legislative
convention for the Communications Act of 2034. What might its principles
look like?
1.

Preamble
Congress, in order to create a more perfect union of various
transmission and content media, establishes principles by which all
electronic communications should be governed, with the goals of

3. Partly for that reason, the Clinton administration proposed in 1994 a new and
voluntary regulatory classification (a new "Title VII" of the Communications Act) for
switched interactive digital broadband transmission. This proposal, too, is not technologyneutral. Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reforms 5 (Jan. 27, 1994)

(copy on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal).
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encouragingthe production of information of many types, sources, and
destinations; assuring the existence of multiple pathways of information; encouraging their spread across society, the economy, and the
world; and enhancingsocial and economic well-being, technology, and
education.
2.

Free Flow of Information

All electronic bits are created equal, and freedom of speech is
technology-neutral. Government shall not prohibit the exercise of
communicationsnor abridgeelectronicspeech, contentprovided by the
electronic press, nor the right of the people to peaceably assemble
electronically.
Freedom of speech, as applied to telecommunications, must assure a
legal parity of electronic speech with traditional forms of communication.
The First Amendment protects speech against governmental restrictions but
not against private constraints. To account for private constraints, the legal
institution of common carriage established a free flow of information over
some telecommunications networks. Common carriage is a frequently
misunderstood concept. It means nondiscriminatory conduit service by a
carrier, neutral as to content, users, and usage.4 It does not mean universal
service, regulated monopoly, or rate-of-return regulation.
Common carriage is not only a free speech matter. The reason for
common carriage, whether in transportation or communication, is generally
to reduce transaction costs in the use of infrastructure and hence to benefit
its development. Information travels across numerous subnetworks until it
reaches its destination. If each of these networks sets its own rules about
which information is carried and which is not, information cannot flow
easily. While it may be in the interest of every carrier to maintain full
control over "its" segment, in the aggregate, this would be as dysfunctional
as if each commercial bank issued and used its own money rather than a
common legal tender.
At present, who is a common carrier? Basically, it is a provider of a
public switched telecommunications network. Other carriers operate as
private contract carriers, subject to their own discretion on access and use.
With competition, it is distortive to designate some networks as common
carriers and not others. One alternative is to abolish all private carriage, but
4. The FCC's concept of the video dialtone has such a common carrier orientation. In
the Clinton administration's 1994 Title VII proposal, "open access" was substituted as a
term for common carriage and defined to permit "anyone, including end users and
information service providers .... to transmit information including voice, data, and video
programming, on a non-discriminatory basis."
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that would violate principles of property and freedom of association. The
alternative is to abolish all common carrier obligations of nondiscrimination. This may be, in the long run, the outcome of head-to-head competition between common and private carriers.5 The ability of a private carrier
to price differentiate, to select customers, and to use its rival's conduits
whenever it needs to, will all make it superior in head-to-head competition
with common carriage. Hence, the latter will fade away as common carriers
are increasingly permitted to enter into customer-specific contracts and
deals. The last alternative-hybrid solutions that try to assure the
coexistence of common and private carriage-will not be stable in a
dynamic environment.
What is needed, therefore, is to reconcile an essentially private carrierbased communications system with the free flow of information. One way
to do this is by replacing the principle of common carriage by a new
principle of third-party neutral interconnection. A carrier can elect to be
private by running its own end-to-end infrastructure, thus having full
control over its content, use, and access. However, if it interconnects into
other networks and accepts transmission traffic from them, it cannot screen
the traffic and pick some bits over other bits. This means that while a
private carrier can be selective in its choice of its direct customers-whether end-users, content providers, or carriers-it cannot differentiate among its customers' customers. For example, if some content A is
carried by a carrier B that is interconnected into carrier C, C cannot screen
out that content, nor can any other carrier do so that is interconnected to
C and to which A is being passed. To exclude A would require that not a
single carrier of type B would be willing to accept it, and that such a
carrier would not be granted interconnection by any other carrier type C.
While such containment is possible, it is not particularly likely. Such a
principle is similar to arrangements in commercial paper, sales, and legal
tender, where the law discourages restraints on alienation.
The common carriage goals of informational free-flow and low
transaction cost are preserved by such a system of third-party neutral traffic
interconnection. This principle does not require transmission on economically equal terms, as in the case of common carriage, but does establish the
possibility of arbitrage if differentiated pricing occurs.
Competitive transmissionsegments need not be common carriers,
but among interconnectedcarriers,no carriercan selectively transmit
trafficpassedon to it by anothercarrierbasedon content, uses, or usage.

5. Eli Noam, The Impending Doom of Common Carriage,18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POL'VY 435 (1994).
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Where no competition exists in an essential conduit, service must
be offered on a common carrierbasis on at least part of the capacity.
Any interconnectivity requirements and charges must be symmetrical.
3.

Market Structure and Prices

In the past, control over entry and prices was the major tool of
regulation. For a network of networks these retrictions are obsolete.
Government shall make no regulation establishing a network
privileged in terms of territory,function, or national origin. Nor shall
it burden any network more than its competitors, except with compensation.
Entry by any content or conduit provider is open. Competitive
conduits and all content shall be pricedfreely.Price orprofit regulated
segments must be separated in some fashion from unregulatedones.
4.

Reliability and Security

Interconnected networks affect each other negatively if one of them
inadequately protects security and privacy. Market forces can play an
important role, but only if users and networks have information about
foreseeable dangers.
Interconnected carriersin a chain of transmission must disclose
foreseeablejeopardies to privacy and security.
5.

Universality of Networks
At present, redistribution operates within the public network across
customers. This system cannot be stable in a competitive environment.
Instead, these subsidies that are to be maintained need to be explicit and
neutrally distributed across competitors.
Where Congress mandates to support some users or usages for
social and economic reasons, such support must be generated and
allocated explicitly, and any burden must be placed neutrally on all
market competitors.
Where a new service is subscribed to by a wide majority of the
population at market prices, a rebuttablepresumption is created to
affordably connect to such a service the remainder of the population
desiring it.
6.

Jurisdiction
The traditional notion ofjurisdictional separation was based on a linear,
spatial concept of networks. Networks were configured to minimize
transmission distance. But as transmission costs decline, telecommunica-
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tions becomes distance-insensitive, and definitions of interstate, intrastate,
and national services become increasingly irrelevant. Networks become
relational, not locational.
Information should move freely across interstateand international
borders, without unreasonable burdens by state or nationaljurisdictions. No content or carrierfrom abroad should be treated more
restrictively than domesticproviders, provided meaningful reciprocity
is given.
The federal jurisdiction sets basic national telecommunications
policy where it can demonstrate that nationalsolutions are necessary.
Application and implementation may lie with lower-level governmental
bodies, which may also set policy for functions of clearly local or
regional nature.
CONCLUSION

These principles, in the aggregate, provide a framework that provides
an integration of common and private carriage, of narrow and broadband
networks, and of domestic and international providers. Furthermore, they
do so without the prerequisite of an official "public" network.
To return to the original question, whether or not telecommunications
will operate effectively under the guidance of an invisible hand mechanism-the answer is, to a large extent, yes-but only on a foundation of
basic rules of the road, with less of a "retail approach" of detailed
legislation and more of the "wholesale approach" of policy principles. As
communications media converge, the invisible hand must be ultimately
connected to a body of law. Ritualistically invoking competition is not
enough. We need a principled superstructure for the technical infrastructure.

